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ESSAY

THE NATURAL LAW OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
WILLIAM

H.

RODGERS, JR.*

Law teachers and researchers today are strongly committed to borrowing models, theories, paradigms, and just plain ideas from other disciplines
to explain legal phenomena.' History long has been treated by legal academics and courts as a respectable source of legal inspiration. In recent
years, law people have embraced the models of economics and moral philosophy, sometimes with an enthusiasm that is hard to explain.2 Now it is
psychology3 or decision theory4 or anthropology5 that is said to offer the key
insight, decisive to the resolution of a particular legal problem.
For the most part, the new law modeling has drawn upon research in
the social sciences. There are reasons for this: lawyers and law teachers are
social scientists, with undergraduate educations concentrated heavily upon
such subjects as economics, history, and political science; law faculties traditionally have limited their interdisciplinary contacts to the social sciences;
and law, devoted as it is to the ordering of human affairs, could be expected
to look to the social sciences for insights into how the written rules of life
affect human relationships.
These legal versions of social science model-building have been by no
Professor of Law, University of Washington. B.A., 1961, Harvard University; LL.B., 1965, Columbia University. This paper was distributed initially at a
workshop on Teaching Administrative Law sponsored by the Association of American Law Schools.
1. See Symposium, Legal Scholarship.- Its Nature andPurposes, 90 YALE LJ. 955
(1981).
2. See, e.g., Horwitz, Law andEconomics: Science or Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV.
905 (1980); Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analsis ofEntitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN.
L. REV. 387 (1981); Rodgers, Building Theories ofludicial Review in Natural Resources
Law, 53 U. COLO. L. REv. 213 (1981).
3. See, e.g., Loh, Psycholegal Research: Past and Present, 79 MICH. L. REV. 659
(1981).
4. See, e.g., Brooks, The Law of Plan Implementation in the United States, 16 URB.
L. ANN. 225 (1979); Diver, Poliymaking Paradigmsin Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L.
REx'. 393 (1981); Rodgers, Judicial Review of Risk Assessments: The Role of Decision
Theory in Unscramblingthe Benzene Decision, 11 ENVTL. LAw 301 (1981); Leff, Law and,
87 YALE L.J. 989 (1978).
5. See, e.g., SelznickJurisprudenceandSocialPolicy: AspirationsandPerspectives, 68
CALIF. L. REV. 206 (1980).
*
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means universally successful, and some of these efforts may strike us as remote descriptive caricatures of the human condition.6 It all depends on the
intuitive appeal of the descriptive picture, the persuasive power and
testability of the claimed linkages, and how the posited associations appear
in light of empirical reality. This paper suggests that the natural sciences,
like the social sciences, can be put to use in the construction of law-related
modeling.7 I am interested in descriptive theory, and I suggest that the
natural sciences offer phenomena with descriptive credentials deserving no
less a priori respect for law modeling than the social sciences that are now
drawn upon so heavily.
Law teachers and researchers are inveterate seekers of metaphors. The
metaphor, even if glib and obvious, invariably suggests further parallels and
relationships, the conjoinder of phenomena. This is the road to uncovering
unsuspected linkages and building simple descriptive models. Theory
building, in administrative law as elsewhere, begins with the capture and
expression of the convincing metaphor.
Extracting metaphors from the natural sciences to account for social
happenings begins with a figure of speech and often ends there. Legislatures now are squeezing fat out of administrative agencies, an apt biological
picture of a weight watcher's rigor being imposed on flabby, middle-aged
institutions. Some agencies are considered senile (the ICC), others appeared on this planet stillborn (the Department of Energy), still others are
going through an identity crisis or are in hibernation (the EPA). Yet others
survive by establishing parasitic or symbiotic relationships with supporting
institutions. Is the Corps of Engineers a leech or a virus? Those water
projects are buried so deeply in the body politic that the Reagan cutbacks
cannot reach them; they are cancers immune from cosmetic surgery. And
so on. We draw our metaphors from horticulture: a little pruning here will
concentrate growth over there. From navigation: "midcourse corrections"
(the Clean Air and Water Acts), "fogbound and foundering." From paleontology: the dinosaur (the Bureau of Land Management) is ill-suited to
survival under contemporary conditions.
The important step, of course, is to move beyond the mere figure of
speech to the convincing metaphor that has some explanatory and organizing persuasiveness.
A.

The Entropy Laws. Models of Decline

The second law of thermodynamics holds that in closed systems heat
cannot be completely transformed into work; something is lost along the
6. See, e.g., Horwitz, supra note 2; Kennedy, supra note 2; Rodgers, Bringing
People Back: Toward a Comprehensive Theoy of Taking in Natural Resources Law, 10
ECOLOGY L.Q. 205 (1982).
7. For a companion piece to this paper, see Rodgers, supra note 2.
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way.8 This law of nature-which, by the way, has not been discovered by
many economists-is obviously pertinent to issues of energy policy where a
physical efficiency model (getting the most work out of a particular allocation) is competitive with an economic efficiency model (getting the most
dollars out of the allocation).' But the entropy laws go farther to suggest
ideas of disintegration, decay, and collapse over time that could be applied
to social institutions. They are a kind of Murphy's law of the physical
sciences.
Consider, for example, how the entropy laws might be invoked to assist
in developing a theory of legislation. The prevailing view of legislation is
that of sustained consensus over time. This theory would predict a stable
allocation of authority on a given subject. Another view,"0 which I endorse, 1 is that legislation is better perceived as a temporary accommodation of interests that comes apart over time. Thus a statute gradually falls
prey to repeals by implication, administrative revisionism, more recent enactments, and judicial gloss that puts an entirely new face on the old law.
The predicted result, describing the resolving power of legislation over time,
could be expressed "by a curve that slopes downward and then evens off as
the courts insist upon enforcing the core of even outdated legislation as the
most responsible way to inspire a contemporary legislative judgment."'"
So, too, the advent of the sunset laws 3 suggests the need for a theory of
institutional decay. What help can physical laws be in developing such a
theory? Biological organisms, faced with starvation, tend to protect the vital organs by shedding the fat first. The pattern suggests a model that most
likely represents the predominant political view during the present budget
cutbacks. At the University of Washington, for example, we were faced
recently with a proposed ten percent budget cut. Suppose there were ten
successive cuts of the same magnitude. Look around your law school or
university and ask how such losses would be allocated. Fat first? Then
what? Is there any doubt about who would be left after step nine? Does
this make the dean's office the heart of the organization? The brain? The
reproductive organs?
All I am suggesting is that the observable phenomenon of organiza8. See J. RIFKIN, ENTROPY: A NEW WORLD VIEW 33-43 (1980).
9. See Federal Power Comm'n v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365
U.S. 1 (1961); W. RODGERS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENERGY AND NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW 368-71 (1979).
10. See generally G. CALABRESI,

A

COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES

(1982); Davies, Gilmore & Calabresi, A Response to Statutoq Obsolescence. The Nonprimacy of Statutes Act, 4 VT. L. REV. 203 (1979).
11. Rodgers, supra note 2, at 218.
12. Id (citing Wilderness Society v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973)).
13. See S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY
POLICY 146-47 (1979).

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

tional decay to the point of disappearance suggests new lines of inquiry and
metaphors about agency behavior. My belief in the transitory nature of
statutes and administrative regulations has led me to formulate a general
principle, called Rodgers' Constant or, more popularly, the Rule of Ruin,
which holds that the irreversible process of legal decay inevitably creates a
detectable gap between the declared rules and the prevailing practice. This
gap often can be characterized as lawlessness or fiasco, and it suggests a
need for functional and empirical studies of agency behavior, not simply
investigations of the formal record. This hypothesis can inform a research
program. It often guides litigation where discovery is designed to validate
hypothecized instances of the gap.
What can be predicted about judicial review by courts convinced that
agencies muddle through with outmoded regulations and policy that departs from formal legislative norms? Such courts take a hard look to ascertain what the rules of the game were and how well they were explained to
the losers. 4
Another discouraging natural science idea suggesting models of decline
is that of species overspecialization. Rooted in evolutionary biology, overspecialization occurs when a species finds itself on an evolutionary track
from which there is no turning back."5 Specialists, of course, are very good
at what they do, so it is perhaps not surprising in administrative law that
deference to experts is a byword. But there is a point at which the expert
becomes too good at fine work and is unable to cope with the exigencies
imposed by a new environment. The normal biological outcome is extinction. It is not surprising that this biological metaphor has brought us to the
point of sunset laws, of decisions where specialization is a badge of suspicion
in light of new values,' 6 and of mandate-modifiers (i.e., NEPA) designed to
fight off overspecialization.
Another idea suggested by the entropy laws and similar machine models is that of limited energy to accomplish interest group or agency goals.
As an observer of the Northwest fishing conflicts, I am convinced that the
intense efforts by the losing nontreaty groups to reverse the outcome in the
courts 7 took some force out of the political efforts to win a legislative overruling of the judgment in the Congress. This was a case of dissipation of
14. See Rodgers, Benefits, Costs, and Risks: Oversight of Health and Environmental
Decisionmaking, 4 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 191, 214-15 (1980).
15. See generaly P. EHRLICH & A. EHRLICH, EXTINCTION: THE CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES OF THE DISAPPEARANCE OF SPECIES (1981).
16. See Leventhal, EnvironmentalDecisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U.
PA. L. REV. 509, 523-24 (1974) (suggesting close review where agency expertise is
hostile to environmental values). See also Estreicher, PragmaticJustice: The Contributions ofJudge HaroldLeventhal to Administrative Law, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 894 (1980).
17. These culminated unsuccessfully in the United States Supreme Court's decision in Washington v. Washington State Comm'l Pass. Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443
U.S. 658 (1979).
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limited influence. Assume that agencies have comparable needs to husband
influence and fight only limited battles. How would such a view of agency
behavior influence judicial review? One would expect tolerance for the
drawing of administrative lines of convenience that would make more manageable the fulfillment of congressional goals."8 The husbanding of limited
resources would become an important value recognized by judicial review.
B.

Models of Equilibriumor Punctuated Change

Circumstances do not necessarily get worse. Sometimes they just
change or appear to change. Physical laws are at work here, too, and they
may be put to use in understanding legal phenomena.
Evolution is a dominant influence in the history of ideas although the
term often appears in legal discussions as simply synonymous with
change.1 9 A closer look at evolutionary biology2" discloses that the process
itself requires variations in the population, random or otherwise, competition or other means of selection, and differences in survival rates. Assuming
21
for the moment that agencies strive to protect their decisions, the courts
serve as the chief means of selection, significantly influencing what future
rulings will look like. Under this brutal metaphor the courts are predators
feeding on agency offspring too feeble to withstand the hard look. The approach opens up interesting questions for empirical inquiry into attack and
survival rates, agency means for modifying its decision-types, and the effectiveness of judicial selection. What are the differences, for example, in the
agency response to an outright 22reversal and to the raised eyebrow that
promises sterner measures later?
Many judges view themselves as instruments of evolutionary changeor at least write as if they do. Academics, accustomed to recursive or cybernetic modes of thought, prefer judicial decisions that are long on dicta,
filled with speculation about future trends and advice about agency behavior. These are the opinions we put in our casebooks, starting our own process of natural selection favoring the fifty-page essay.
18. See Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle, 578 F.2d 337, 346 (D.C. Cir.
1978).
19. See generally Clark, The Interdsciplinaqr Stud of Legal Evolution, 90 YALE LJ.
1238 (1981).
20. See S.

LURIA, S. GOULD & S. SINGER,

A VIEW

OF LIFE

(1981);

J. KREBS

&

(1981).
21. They do not always do so, however. Agencies sometimes appear to give
expansive readings to judicial decisions overturning administrative rulings. Such a
N.

DAVIES, AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL ECOLOGY

response might serve a variety of agency needs, including the need to promote formal decisionmaking or to placate reallocation losers by assigning responsibility to
an outside and alien force.
22. See Shell Oil Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 520 F.2d 1061, 1071 (5th Cir.
1975); Pierce & Shapiro, PoliticalandJudiialReviewof Agency Action, 59 TEX. L. REV.
1175, 1188-89 (1981).
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A recent trend of thought in evolutionary biology is to substitute ideas
of punctuated equilibrium, of rapid and episodic change, for the gradualism -associated with classical Darwinism.2 3 Similar ideas are at large in
modern geological thinking. The common law is the legal analogue
brought to mind by gradualist theories. Administrative law might be better
described by notions of punctuated change where episodic legislative, judicial, or executive intervention brings fits and starts in particular policy
fields.24 Without elaborating further, it is not implausible that courts viewing their product as just another entry in the flow of the common law would
behave differently than those perceiving2 their
utterances as marking the
5
onset of a new era of administrative law.
Equilibrium is another common idea from physics, raising suggestive
metaphors for administrative lawyers.2 6 The idea recognizes a condition of
stable inputs, or at least stable outputs, and balanced performance over
time. Agencies with agendas of routine adjudication (i.e., the FERO),
proven staying power, and strong institutional ties to the Congress are likely
to be in equilibrium. Courts will treat this output circumspectly or at least
with indifference. 27 Agencies with novel agendas, rulemaking pretensions,
and a fractious constituency are treated with skepticism. The hard look
doctrine certainly has arisen in the rulemaking context marked by sudden
legislative initiatives, controversy, and disequilibrium. Rulemaking review
is the hotbed of catastrophe theory in administrative law.28
Another phenomenon observed by the physical sciences and adaptable
to law is that of cyclical change. I don't dare ask Walter Gellhorn or Clark
Byse or Nat Nathanson what they think of this outbreak of "new"ideas,
suggesting limits on the hard look review that represents today's synthesis of
administrative law. 29 I have been around just long enough to suffer termi23.

For a forceful statement of this view, see S. GOULD, THE PANDA'S THUMB:
179-85 (1980). See generally S. STANLEY, THE NEW EVOLUTIONARY TIMETABLE: FossILs, GENES, AND THE ORIGIN OF
SPECIES (1981).
MORE REFLECTIONS IN NATURAL HISTORY

24. See Rodgers, supra note 4, at 313-14. See also Goldberg, Controlling Basic Science: The Case ofNuclear Fusion, 68 GEO. L.J. 683, 720-25 (1980).
25. See Calvert Cliffs Coord. Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n,
449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
26. Contrast the idea of an evolutionary stable strategy, derived from population biology. See R. DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 74-94 (1976).
27. Cf. Rodgers, supra note 2, at 216 (suggesting deference to culturally preferred allocation rules); Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, andAdministrative Law: A Conceptual Framework, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1256, 1341-53 (1981) (suggesting deference to
consensus standards).
28. See generally R.
ENGINEERS (1981).

GILMORE, CATASTROPHE THEORY FOR SCIENTISTS AND

29. See Rodgers, supra note 14, at 216-18 (urging acceptance of "soft glance"
component ofjudicial review). The recommendations of Stewart can be read, perhaps unfairly, as advice to return to the discredited days of the New Deal where
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nal smugness when observing the replay of some of the environmental controversies of the early 1970's. There are reasons to believe that the answers
to some of the more enduring questions of administrative law, such as the
degree of deference, might evolve on a cyclical basis. The competing considerations are delicately balanced; once a critical mass representing a trend
is established, it is subject to rapid reinforcement and acceleration by the
sheer volume ofjudicial review case law. The result is an oscillation around
the norm and could be depicted by a type of curve familiar to population
biologists-rapid growth, followed by collapse, build-up, and another period of rapid growth. Witness, in this regard, the phenomenal rise of the
hard look in the wake of the 1971 Overton Park30 decision and the striking
retrenchment after Vermont Yankee 3 came down in 1978.
C. Models of Growth or Improvement
Optimism is a powerful guide, in law as elsewhere, and only someone
with a miserly mind-set could say anything against it. Growth models,
dominated by the search for the bigger pie, rule economics and, I would
argue, politics as well.32 Natural laws of growth and improvement are everywhere evident, with evolutionary biology often-if mistakenly--cited as
confirmation.
A more-is-better philosophy is evident in administrative law, too. I
have argued elsewhere 33 that the great process explosion associated with the
hard look doctrine is attributable in part to the fact that process fairness is
not a zero-sum good. Unlike many entitlements of status or resource
wealth, giving some process to A does not necessarily withdraw a like
amount from B. We can afford to be generous with process. Upon such
assumptions, courts at least should be receptive to legislative efforts to expand the roster of process beneficiaries-less immunity, more standing,
hearings, impact statements.
Suppose, however, that the question being reviewed involves not the
administrative grant of a growing resource but a reallocation, where A's
gain is B's loss. B, once a worried onlooker, is now a proven loser. Can we
expect an intensified judicial look at administrative zero-sum choices? How
does or should this review differ from that extended in non-zero-sum
contexts?
Consider another variation. Suppose the legislature, with its more-isbetter conviction, proposes to double the supply of harvestable fish by dibargains were struck behind closed doors in smoke-filled rooms. See Stewart, supra
note 27, at 1341-53.
30. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
31. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978). See generally Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal
Rulemaking, 55 TULANE L. REV. 418 (1981).
32. See R. NiSBET, HISTORY OF THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1978).
33. See Rodgers, supra note 2, at 227.
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recting administrative implementation of a hatchery expansion program.
In developing the rules implementing the program, the agency is besieged
by evidence contradicting each and every empirical premise of the legislative action: more hatcheries mean fewer fish because hatchery gains are
offset by natural losses due to interspecies predation, food competition, genetic dilution, changed harvest practices, and so on. Assume further that
the fish are distributed in a new pattern, so that the policy thoroughly revises the roster of winners and losers consisting of the people who fish.
Without knowing the specifics, can we say anything instructive about
the role, or perhaps more importantly the form, of judicial review of these
rules implementing the hatchery policy? The court, of course, is stuck with
the policy choice, however rash and optimistic it might be, but it should not
be duty-bound to pay obeisance to all the empirical nonsense bound up in
that choice. I, for one, would applaud a tough and skeptical hard look
opinion, with venomous dicta, pointing out how unconvincing certain legislative assumptions appear in light of an improved record.3 4 It is assumed
here that the administrative record is thorough, thus giving rise to a judicial
conviction about what the facts are. The court has an important function
to play in the process of perpetual reassessment associated with regulatory
legislation.3 5 A tentative legislative choice, which most of them are, should
not be read as freezing the empirical world at the moment of utterance.
D.

Models of Uncertainty

One of the questions that bedevils us, in fashioning the scope ofjudicial review, is how much information is enough to sustain the administrativejudgment below? There are several ways to look at this.36 I would like
to focus on the inevitable uncertainty in human affairs and the lessons this
suggests for judicial review.
Uncertainty is rampant in the physical sciences, often in ways that
must seem intolerable to a profession like ours that tends to equate thoroughness of inquiry with approximation of truth. The fossil record, for example, offers a limited peek at our past; these are grab-bag samples of
convenience and heavily skewed by geological caprice. Repeatedly, however, these bits and pieces have been put to use to support sweeping inferential judgments. Nothing less than the evolutionary history of human beings
34. I will acknowledge the delicacy of the normative assertion that the record
before the agency, and therefore the court, might be "better" than the one before
the legislature. A reading of the negative burden on commerce cases, however, suggests that this statement is sometimes supportable. See Southern Pacific R.R. v.
Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 788 (1945) (Black, J., dissenting). Legislatures, of course, are
free to act without facts, or despite them, although they usually claim a consistency
with empirical reality.
35. See Rodgers, supra note 4, at 315-17.
36. See Rodgers, supra note 2, at 226.
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has been rewritten and corrected many times.3 7 There is no other choice
except to suspend judgment indefinitely. The "best available evidence" is
distressingly thin.
The fossil record example and others like it suggest that we should be
wary of models of comprehensive rationality that generate dissatisfaction by
demanding proof not present and accounted for.3" In rulemaking review,
perhaps this means that courts should focus on determinations of acceptable methodology, not the factual products of the search. The "hard look"
needs a "soft glance" component to protect professional judgments based on
limited data. 9 It is a simple concession to necessity.
Another blow at comprehensive rationality is provided by the quantum mechanics revolution in physics. In quantum mechanics, "it is not possible, even in principle, to know enough about the present to make a complete
prediction about the future."4 ° Heisenburg's famous uncertainty principle
holds that in the subatomic realm we cannot know both the position and
momentum of a particle with absolute precision; the more we know about
one, the less we know about the other. Future behavior cannot be predicted, only approximated by probability statements.
Metaphors are always imperfect, and people may not follow the same
rules as electrons. But there is little to suggest that the outcomes of human
endeavors are more tightly determined than the behavior of subatomic particles and much to the contrary. I, for one, find comforting the view that
my own failed predictions are the consequences of an uncertainty principle,
not simply ineptitude in fact-gathering. For those inclined to this point of
view, we have added the realities of limited predictability to the rationale
for a soft glance component of hard look review.4 1 This is another concession to necessity.
A third qualifier of comprehensive rationality world views comes from
the domain of psychology and emphasizes what could be called the nonra37. See generally D. JOHANSON & M. EDEY, Lucy: THE BEGINNINGS OF HuMANKIND (1981). Cf J. DAVIDSON & M. LYTLE, AFTER THE FACT: THE ART OF
HISTORICAL DETECTION iii (1982) (discussing difficulties of historians in determining whether research is complete).
38. See Diver, supra note 4, at 399-400.
39. See Rodgers, supra note 14, at 216.
40. G. ZuKAv, THE DANCING WuLI MASTERS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE NEW
PHYSICS 52 (1979).

Even if we have the time and determination, it is not possible. Even if we
have the best possible measuring devices, it is not possible. It is not a
matter of the size of the task or the inefficiency of the detectors. The very
nature of things is such that we must choose which aspect of them we wish
to know best, for we can only know one of them with precision.

Id See also H. PAGELS, THE COSMIC CODE: QUANTUM PHYSICS AS THE LANGUAGE OF NATURE 17-190 (1982).

41.

See Rodgers, supra note 14, at 217.
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tional, intuitive, or creative aspects of human thought.4 2 To borrow from
one among many maps of the human mind, dwell for a moment on the
differences between what have been described as horizontal and vertical
modes of thinking.43 Horizontal thinking is divergent, creative, exploratory; vertical thinking is convergent, reductive, and thorough. This map of
the mind metaphor, if you like it, conveys a somewhat different lesson about
the scope of judicial review in administrative rulemaking. Creative administrative judgments, call them experimentation, should certainly be protected. We thus build again on our soft glance rationale, which already
acknowledges limited data and limited predictability, by adding the pre44
caution that agencies must be given room to make creative choices. Add
the assumption that true innovation will come from sources outside the
agency, and judicial review is given some new directions. External advice
from authoritative voices should be taken seriously by the agencies, and the
hard look doctrine requires it.45 External advice from political bodies will
46
be taken seriously by the agencies, and the hard look doctrine permits it.
But honoring the creative leaps of the horizontal thinkers surely has its
limits. How many of us believe that what administrative law needs today is
a heavy dose of respect for administrative intuition? Should NRC licenses
be issued upon an intuitive sense that the radioactive waste problem will
turn out all right in the long run? We want horizontal thinking within the
agencies, to be sure, but there is something to be said also for the nitty gritty
of converging on right answers after the right questions have been asked.
Imagine a world of Roberto Ungers without hornbooks. The hard look
doctrine needs no apologies for demanding closely reasoned results and explanations of methodology from the agencies.4 7 This process sharpens the
kind of decisionmaking agencies do best: dealing with incremental changes
42. See id at 217 nn. 176, 177. Is there any doubt about the high frequency of
nonrational or judgmental components in human thought? Do you believe, for example, that your favorite professor's recent choice of a research project, surely the
epitome of rational choice, could withstand a GAO investigation? The topic
evolved out of a paper presented at a conference? How does one decide to participate in a conference? Is this professionally important time allocation decision made
on the basis of who asked first? Did the same criteria apply to one's choice in marriage? Isn't this a subject that should be shielded from the hard look? There are
differences, of course, between personal and collective spur-of-the-moment decisions. But problems of judgment apply to both kinds of choices.
43. See C. HAMPDEN-TURNER, MAPS OF THE MIND: CHARTS AND CONCEPTS
OF THE MIND AND ITS LABYRINTHS 104 (1981).

44. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 6-7 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
45.

See W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 300-01 (discussing role of Na-

tional Academy of Sciences in establishing auto emissions standards).
46. See Gellhorn & Robinson, Rulemaking "Due Process':"An Inconclusive Dialogue,
48 U. CHI. L. REV. 201, 203-04 (1981).
47. See Rodgers, A HardLook at Vermont Yankee: EnvironmentalLaw Under Close
Scrutiny, 67 GEO. L.J. 699, 704-08 (1979).
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in a tightly structured world, acting as the vertical workhorse serving those
horizontal sages in the Congress.
E.

Conclusion

Of the pain inflicted on law students within the nation's law schools,
administrative law as it is customarily taught accounts for more than its fair
share. The case law is strongly wedded to empty verbalization and dry
classification. Breaking out of these habits of thought and expression requires metaphor-making and a good deal more. All I have attempted to
accomplish in this paper is to suggest that natural science theory is rich in
metaphor and that there is something there that can be put to use in building theories of administrative law.

